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THE AMENDING OF ARTICLES 23 AND 27
OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER:
A MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS
Robert S. Junn*

I.

Intoduction

From the time of the San Francisco Conference, the
composition of the Security Council and its voting procedure
was most severely criticized. The basic criticism had been
the veto power of the five permanent members on substantive
resolutions. 1 This resulted in a long and vigorous political
struggle on the part of the non-veto members of the
Organization to amend the Charter in order to increase their
voting strength in the Security Council. 2 When the changes
on membership and voting procedure came into force on
August 31, 1965, a great victory was claimed.3
This case of
the United Nations is intriguing and deserves attention of
legal scholars, mainly because the proponents for the amendment
to the Charter had no knowledge of intricacy in the relationship between its unique procedural formality of voting mechanism

Chairman, Department of Political Science, Grand Valley
State College.
1. For official accounts of this criticism see, 11 UNITED
NATIONS INFORMATION ORGANIZATION, DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, SAN FRANCISCO,
*

1945 (1945).
2. See G.A. Res. 1919, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15, U.N. Doc.
A/5515 (1963).
See generally 2 REPERTORY OF PRACTICE OF UNITED
NATIONS ORGANS 3-14 (1955) [hereinafter cited as REPERTORY OF
PRACTICE]; 5 REPERTORY OF PRACTICE 401; 1 REPERTORY OF PRACTICE

243-47, 269-76 (Supp. 1, 1958); 2 REPERTORY OF PRACTICE 277-82,
307-14 (Supp. 2, 1964). For a narrative study of the development
see, Schwelb, Amendments to Articles 23, 27, and 61 of the
Charter of the United Nations, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 834-56 (1965).
3. Prior to the change, the membership of the Security
Council consisted of 5 permanent and 6 non-permanent members.
As amended it consists of 5 permanent and 10 non-permanent
members. The amended Article 27 provides that decisions of the
Council on non-procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative
vote of 9 members (formerly 7), including the concurring votes
of the 5 permanent members of the Security Council.

and the distribution of voting power as was "concealed" in
the Charter. The purpose of this article is not to discuss
juridical points but to analyze this concealed knowledge
which should have been known in the course of amending the
harter. The analysis will demonstrate that the so-called
political victory turned out to be an empirical defeat
and it will examine power distributions under two alternative plans for future amendments to the Charter.
II.

Defining the a priori Voting Power

The concept of power has been widely used by social
scientists from the Greek period; however, it is still an
imprecisely defined concept.4 For the purpose of this paper,
the concept is defined from a limited standpoint, based on
one of the properties of power of a committee system.
In a committee, which decides by voting, members have
certain portions of voting strength. This voting strength,
excluding other properties of power whatever they may be,
is called the a priori voting power.
The formula measuring the a priori voting power as applied
in this paper was developed in 1954. 5 According to Shubik and
and Shapley, "the voting power of an individual member [of a
committee] depends on the chance he has of being critical to
the.success of a winning coalition." 6 In a voting committee

4. See generally Dahl, Power, 12 INT'L ENCYC. SOC. SCI.
405-15 (1968) (contains an especially helpful bibliography).
5. Shapley & Shubik, A Method for Evaluating the
Distribution of Power in a Committee System, 48 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 787-92 (1954). The Shapley-Shubik study is the only method
available for measuring the a priori power of a committee system.
Some attempts have been made to measure other properties of
"power." See generally Riker, Some Ambiguities in the Notion
of Power, 58 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 341-49 (1964).

6.

Shapley & Shubik, supra note 5, at 787.

whose rules of voting prescribe what proportion of votes
constitutes a winning proportion, each voting member has a
certain probability of casting the last required vote for a
winning coalition. Hence the voting power of each committee
member depends on the ratio of the number of possible times
each member may cast the pivotal vote in an ordered permu7
tation to the number of ordered permutations possible.
Suppose the k members are ordered mi,

m

2

, .

. , mk according

.

to how likely they are to vote for a measure. If the prescribed rules of the committee for the winning coalition is
q,

then a winning coalition must contain mI,

m

2

, . . . I m

Therefore, if the set ml, m 2 , . . . . mq is a winning coalition,

then the mq is the pivotal position. To state this reasoning
mathematically, we quote William Riker's expression as follows:
Pi =

mi)
n!

where P is the power to determine outcomes in a voting
body for a participant, i, in a set of participants:
1, 2, . . . , n where m(i) is the number of times i is
in the pivotal position and where pivotal position is
defined thus: when the rules define q vote as winning,
n+ 1
2

q -: n

or

n + 1 S q 4 n,
2

the pivot position is the qth position in an ordered
sequence of votes. 8
Let us illustrate. Suppose k=3. Suppose also, each of
the three-member committee has one vote and the winning coalition
is by majority.

In the sequence of mI,

m 2 , m 3 , the pivotal vote

7. For a mathematical proof of this indexing scheme see,
Shapley, A Value For N-Person Games, 28 ANNALS OF MATH. STUDY
307-17 (1953). For an elementary treatment of permutation see,
J. KEMENY, J. SNELL, & G. THOMPSON, INTRODUCTION TO FINITE
MATHEMATICS chs. 3, 4 (2d ed. 1966) (the Shapley-Shubik index
is described at 79-82; applications of the index may be found
at 113-15).
Cf. Brams & O'Leary, An Axiomatic Model of Voting
Bodies, 64 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 449-70 (1970).
8. Riker, supra note 5, at 341.

is the second position, (M2 ). Thus there are 2: ways each
member may become the pivot. Therefore, the a priori voting
power of each member of this committee is
1 9
2!
3!
III.

3

The Distribution of Voting Power
in the Security Council

We now apply this principle to the Security Council of
the United Nations. According to the original rules prescribed in Article 27 of the Charter, the resolutions of a
substantive nature required seven majority votes, including
the five permanent members. In other words, a winning
, m 7 and a
coalition was required to contain mI, m 2 , . .
losing coalition was mi, m 2 , . . . , m 7 -1 . Therefore, the
.

Hence a non-permanent member can
pivotal position is M7.
yield its voting power when it casts the 7th positive vote,
following the Five. Computation of the voting power of each
member of the Security Council is not so simple (for a
detailed explanation, see Appendix). First, it is necessary
to find out the number of ways a non-permanent member can be
arranged to become a pivot. The number of arrangements are
1
(5)
5

.6:.

4:i
10

for the following reasons. We denote the Big Five and the
Small Six by B1 , B 2 , B 3 , B 4 , B 5 ; S I , S 2 , S3 , S4 , S5, S6 .
The permutation of one S preceding the pivot is (5).6:.
Next the permutatiog of four other S's is 4! . Therefore,
there are exactly (1).6! .4 alignments in which one S
becomes the pivot. Since Pi = M (i, the a priori voting
n!
power of a Six is

(1).6.
11!

.41

-

1

or

0.002164.

462

9. E.g., the number of arrangement is: mI, m 2 , m 3 ; mI,
m3, M 2 ; m2, ml, M3; m2, m3, ml; m 3 , ml, m2; m3 , m 2 , ml. The

second vote being the pivot, each number has power of 2 =
is the number of
5!
10. (5)

(1,

1.

1: (5-1) :

combinations of taking one object at a time out of five objects.
In general,(n\r =
r! n:
(n-r)'

be k

Because the sum total of the powers of the members must
= 1 and because the sum total power of the Six is
6
q6-Z

k!

or

1 , the sum total power of the Five is 1 - 1 = 76
77
T7
7-

Consequently, the voting power of a Five is 76
5
"
77
0.197403.

76
385

or

Now, let us compute the distribution of power of the
Security Council under the amended Articles 23 and 27. Under
the new rules, the Security Council consists of fifteen members
of which ten are non-permanent members and five are vetoholding permanent members. The substantive resolution requires
nine votes, including the five permanent members. The voting
power of a non-permanent member is now thus:

3).8! .6:
15:

4
2145
IV.

or

0.001865

Findings and Analysis

This analysis reveals some interesting points and suggests
some interesting theoretical implications. First, the a priori
voting power of each of the non-permanent members has now been
reduced from 0.002164 to 0.001865 or decline of 0.000299. But
the voting power of the non-permanent members as a group has
increased from 0.012984 to 0.018648 or gain of 0.005664. This
gain, however, is meaningless because they do not vote
collectively. Of course, it should be pointed out that the
extent of self-defeat by loosing the voting power of 0.000299
is minute. But there are two significant aspects of this
finding: one is that had this analysis been known to the
United Nations, the politics of amending the Charter would have
been entirely different (better alternative courses are discussed below); and the other is that this analysis can be applied
to any future changes of the Security Council. Of the former
aspect it seems safe to conclude that the members of the United
Nations had never carefully analyzed the result of the change,
but rather intuitively and falsely assumed that an enlargement
of the non-permanent membership would weaken the voting power
11
of the permanent members.

11. It is submitted that the mathematical analysis of
voting power discussed in the text has simply been unknown

Secondly, these power indices reveal the distribution
of the original a priori voting power between the Five and
the Six at the ratio of 98.7% : 1.3% respectively. Individually
the ratio between a Five and a Six is 90 : 1. These
findings cast doubt on the intuitive notion that the nonpermanent members have "bargaining power" in the politics
of the Security Council. It has been argued that the
Great Powers could not dictate to the Security Council
because numerically the non-permanent members constitute
a majority and because the coalition of the Great Powers
requires two additional votes of support from the nonpermanent members. As analyzed above, however, the socalled "bargaining power" isonegligible.
Thirdly, had the amendment to Article 27 required ten
majority instead of nine (including the permanent members),
it would have been better politics because of the following
reasons: 1) the voting power would have been more equally
distributed, and 2) the voting powers of the non-permanent
members would have been increased approximately twice. For
example, under this ten majority rule, the distribution of
voting power would be thus:
A)

The voting power of a Ten is
(D-9--51

126

15!

or

0.004195

30030

B)

The voting power of the Ten is
126
1260
30030
x 10 = 30030 or 0.041958

C)

The voting power of the Five is
1 -

1260

30030

=

28770

or 0.958042

30030

to the political world in general. An interesting quantitative study somewhat related to this comment might be
mentioned here. In his study of the migration of French
deputies from one party to another in 1953 and 1954,
William Riker found no evidence supporting the contention
that the legislators carefully analyzed effects on their
voting powers resulting from the change of party affiliation.
Riker, A Test of the Adequacy of the Power Index, 4
BEHAVIORAL SCI. 120-31 (1959).

D)

The voting power of a Five is
5

28770

30030

°

28770
150150

or

0.191608

Fourthly, still a better alternative would have been the
thirty-nine member draft resolution submitted on November 3,
1969.
This resolution called for the change of the Security
Council membership from eleven to thirteen and fro the change
of voting procedure for the adoption of a substantive matter
by the Security Council from seven to eight, including the
permanent members. If the majority requirement would have
been nine instead of eight, it would have met the objective
of the non-veto members far more satisfactorily than under the
original rules and procedures of the Security Council. The
following table illustrates this point.

Comparison of Non-Permanent Members' Voting Power
The Original
System:
11 = 5 + 6
with 7
majority
Voting power of
One Non-permanent

The Amended
System:
15 = 5 + 10
with 9
majority

Alternative
System I:
15 = 5 + 10
with 10
majority

Alternative
System II:
13 = 5 + 8
with 9
majority

0.002164

0.001865

0.004195

0.005439

0.012984

0.018648

0.041958

0.043512

Member
Voting Power of
All Non-permanent
Members

Finally, this analysis suggests an interesting implication
for the legal community. It is submitted that perhaps legal
scholarship should endeavor in developing certain theories on
the relationship between the variations of voting body as well
constitution writing.
12. See U.N. GAOR, Special Pol. Comm. Res. 25, U.N. Doc.
A/SPC/L.25 and Add. 1-3 (1969).

APPENDIX

THE FORMULA FOR COMPUTING THE VOTING
POWER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
11.

Number of members.

5.

Number of permanent members.

v= 6.
= 5.
v-1

Number of non-permanent members.
Number of non-permanent members
except the pivot, k.

7.

Number of majority rule required.

V-1

1.

=

=

( mn-v--vl

=

\i

(m - 1):

Number of non-permanent members
preceding k.

= 6!

5.

Number of ways choosing m-v-l out

of n-v-l.
Number of permutation of m -

1

members before k which include five
permanent members.
(n-m) '.=4

(n
m v

-v-1
-

Number of permutations of members
after k.

1/ . (m n:!

)! . (n - m)

Formula for Power Index
of a Six.

